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The “New Charter for Health Care Workers” (hence-
forth referred to as the New Charter) published by the 
Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health 
Care Workers [1] follows on the first edition of the 
charter published in 1995 [2].
The New Charter contains a section (paragraphs 
109-114) dedicated particularly to the matter of “Organ 
and tissue donation and transplantation” [1]. This sec-
tion has been not only updated but also reinforced with 
completely new considerations absent from the corre-
sponding section (paragraphs 83-91) of the previous 
edition (“Donation and transplanting of organs”) [2].
The following paragraphs will briefly compare the ap-
proach of the New Charter on the question of organ 
transplants first with a few other models of bioethics 
and then with the reference ethical principles adopted 
in Italy in the field of organ transplants.
THE ETHICS OF TRANSPLANTATION  
IN SOME MODELS OF BIOETHICS
The field of bioethics is influenced by a number of 
models [3], some of which are rooted in schools of 
thought whose origins go back through many centuries 
of human civilisation. Some models, such as individu-
alism, communitarianism, utilitarianism, deontologism 
and personalism, for instance, are more widely recog-
nised than others: the fundamental principles of each 
can be applied to the issues surrounding the ethics of 
transplantations.
According to individualism, moral principles cannot 
be based on either facts or objective values: they are 
based instead on the autonomous choices of individu-
als. Individualism is thus emphatically non-cognitivistic: 
values are unknowable. In this approach the principle of 
autonomy obviously plays a central role: anything done 
autonomously is legitimate, provided that it does not 
impinge on another person’s freedom [4].
In the individualistic approach to the ethics of trans-
plants the overriding consideration is the individual’s 
freedom to choose whether or not to donate, or even 
to sell, or to refuse any form of transfer. The body is 
considered private property; consent is paramount and 
any form of presumed consent or consent given by third 
parties is inadmissible. The preferred arrangement in 
this perspective is a system based on opting in.
In contrast to individualism, communitarianism en-
courages interpersonal relations. As with individualism, 
there are no universal values: moral values spring from 
the community and the good of the community conse-
quently prevails over that of the individual [5]. 
In a communitarian perspective the ethics of trans-
plants must be based on individual responsibility and 
participation in the common good. However, the com-
mon good should not imply a disproportionate cost for 
the individual: hence a preference for a system based 
on opting in.
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism: the le-
gitimacy or otherwise of an action is judged in terms of 
its consequences and the risk/benefit ratio. The relevant 
criteria are thus efficiency and efficacy, irrespective of 
the intention [6]. One of the key theorists of this model 
was Jeremy Bentham, who stated that: “Nature has 
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placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point 
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and 
wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are 
fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in 
all we say, in all we think” [7].
The utilitarian therefore espouses the belief that the 
donation of organs is a positive event since it implies a 
high probability of saving a life, and deems an opt-out 
arrangement to be more effective, as it is presumed to 
ensure the availability of a higher number of organs.
Deontologism, on the other hand, acknowledges the 
existence of universal rules and duties that must be ob-
served (although moral rules may, regardless of circum-
stances and outside influences, be adapted, if necessary, 
to a specific action) [8]. This is the typical Kantian ap-
proach, summarised in the categorical imperative: “Act 
in such a way that you treat humanity (…) as an end 
and never merely as a means to an end” [9].
In the matter of organ transplants the deontological 
view attributes particular importance to avoiding the 
exploitation of donors and promoting the good of re-
cipients, and prefers an opt-in system.
The approach of personalism holds that “When engag-
ing in any kind of rational thinking, even of a lay nature, 
the human being is the reference point, the end and 
not the means, the transcendent truth for the economy, 
the law and history itself. In discussing medical or bio-
ethical ethics these preconditions of a philosophic order 
must not be thought of as a mere abstraction because 
both ethics and medicine are destined for man, who 
must be considered in the fullness of his worth (…). (It 
is) the human person who is the point of reference and 
the measure of what is legitimate and what is not” [10]. 
Underlying the personalist model are:
• the principle of the defence of the physical life of ev-
ery human individual: every medical act must have 
the patient as its end;
• the therapeutic principle (of totality): the overall 
good of the individual must come before any other 
good of the collectivity;
• the principle of freedom and responsibility: the par-
ticipation of every single individual must be fully 
aware and free from coercion;
• the principle of sociality, solidarity and subsidiarity: 
the common good is achieved by protecting and pro-
moting the good of the individual.
The following paragraphs show how the ethics of or-
gan transplants set forth in the New Charter are typical 
of the personalist approach.
WHICH BIOETHICS MODEL FOR THE 
ETHICS OF TRANSPLANT DONATIONS  
IS EXPOUNDED IN THE NEW CHARTER?
The approach to the ethics of organ and tissue dona-
tion and transplantation described in the New Charter 
[1] is of a typically personalist nature.
The principle of the defence of physical life and the 
therapeutic principle are expressed in the duty to pro-
tect the life of the living donor and of the recipient, the 
establishment of strict criteria to certify death, respect 
for the deceased’s body and for the identity of the donor 
and of the recipient, as well as in application of the cri-
terion of proportionality when reaching decisions.
The principle of freedom and responsibility translates 
into the duty to provide adequate information, obtain 
free and witting consent, avoid all forms of coercion, 
and provide instruction to ensure respect for respon-
sible choices.
The principle of solidarity, as it applies in the set-
ting of organ transplants, is asserted in paragraph 109, 
which first reaffirms the declarations contained in the 
earlier version of the Charter (in paragraph 83): “The 
progress and spread of transplantation medicine today 
allows treatment and recovery of many patients with 
serious ailments who until recently could expect only 
death or at best painful, restricted life” [1, 2]. This is 
followed by an assertion of the principle of solidarity 
that is even more explicit than in the previous version: 
“The donation and transplantation of organs are signifi-
cant expressions of service to life and of the solidarity (in 
italics in the original) that binds human beings together 
and they are a “peculiar form of witness to charity”. For 
these reasons they have a moral value that legitimizes 
their use in medical practice” [1]. The earlier version 
of the Charter had merely stated: “This service to life”, 
which the donation and transplant of organs represents, 
shows its moral value and legitimizes medical practice” 
[2]. Solidarity does not mean that those who are not 
prepared to donate are to blame for the scarcity of avail-
able organs. It is part of an asymmetric reciprocity: the 
gift of an organ is matched by the gift of gratitude. Soli-
darity is not separate from the principle of justice, whether 
distributive justice (“suum unicuique tribuere”) or com-
mutative justice (“neminem laedere”). It also refers to the 
duty to organise services, to take measures to counter 
forms of degeneration (e.g. trade), to adopt effective 
policies to increase the availability of organs, and to 
spread the practice of donating.
THE NEW CHARTER AND THE ETHICS  
OF THE ITALIAN TRANSPLANT NETWORK
The Italian transplant network “endorses a model that 
gives priority to the patient being treated by the physi-
cian. In other words it adopts the therapeutic criterion, 
taking into account the probability of success and re-
jecting any criterion involving social usefulness, which 
could easily become discriminatory.
A person-centred approach to ethics does not, how-
ever, neglect the social dimension: after all, an organ 
available for transplantation is a common good. Thus 
the therapeutic principle must be supplemented with 
additional considerations:
• justice: each patient must have equal access;
• duration of wait: time spent on the waiting list should 
count towards priority;
• clinical usefulness: preferment in the assignment of 
organs for recipients best placed to ensure the longest 
use of them;
• net benefit: introduction of a balance between urgen-
cy and outcome” [11].
The proposals contained in the New Charter on the 
question of donation and transplants are thus fully in 
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agreement with the ethical principles underlying the 
Italian transplant network, which holds that the follow-
ing are essential requirements [12]:
• the implementation of mechanisms to coordinate 
transplant services in accordance with commonly 
shared regulations drawn up in a transparent manner;
• the management of waiting lists that ensure equity, 
justice, traceability and transparency;
• efficient and fair mechanisms for the distribution of 
available organs;
• compliance by personnel with professional obliga-
tions (including refresher courses) set out in the ethi-
cal codes and regulations applying to their relevant 
groups;
• the right of citizens to exhaustive and truthful infor-
mation regarding the planned operation, its possible 
consequences, risks and possible alternative mea-
sures;
• the duty of professional staff to make every effort to 
minimise risks;
• the best possible care for donors and recipients;
• the promotion of the practice of donating, the prime 
objective of which should be the good of the indi-
vidual recipient and of the individual donor.
Accepted on 4 April 2018.
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